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Enactment of the Uniform Arbitration
Act: Reconciling PERA and the U.A.A.
Mark P. Widoftr
with
Michelle Fastiggi "°
I. Introduction
Traditionally, the American common law was not receptive toward
arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution.' For courts, the idea of
yielding their jurisdictional authority to the terms of a mere contract
was heretical.'
For this reason, courts generally did not enforce
specific arbitration clauses.3 To make matters worse, state law also
was biased against arbitration."
To counter this prevailing hostility, in 1925, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the first
Uniform Arbitration Act, an act designed to enforce agreements to
arbitrate controversies nonjudicially.' States' bias against arbitration
remained steadfast, however, because only six states adopted this first
version of the Uniform Arbitration Act.6

*General Counsel, Pennsylvania State Education Association. A.B. 1963 Clark University;
LL.M. 1966 Harvard University.
**Dickinson School of Law J.D. Candidate 1995.
The authors would like to thank James Crawford, Esq., Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, for both reviewing a draft of the article and for making the authors aware of the
authority discussed in footnote 143.
I. See Peter H. Berge, 14 HAMUNLL. REv. 301,303-04 (1991); Gregory K. Barnes et al.,
Project, Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1990 J. DiSP. RESOL. 471, 471;
Angela C. Cole et al., Project,Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1992 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 411, 411. Originating from an article in the Missouri Law Review, the Journal of Dispute
Resolution has undertaken a project to annually survey case law interpreting state versions of the
U.A.A. Cole, supra at 411. Ultimately, the project seeks to promote greater uniformity in U.A.A.
interpretation by analyzing case precedent that provides a framework for interpreting other similar
cases. Id.
2. See Berge, supra note 1, at 303-04.
3. See id.
4. See Barnes, supra note I, at 471.
5. See Berge, supra note 1, at 304-05.
6. See id. at 305 n.19.
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In contrast, Pennsylvania historically has proven to be a state
strongly advocating arbitration as a nonjudicial alternative to dispute
resolution. Pennsylvania was one of the six states to adopt the
Conference's first Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 which in Pennsylvania
was titled the Arbitration Act of 1927." In fact, in 1943, when the
Conference decided to withdraw its first Uniform Arbitration Act
because of a lack of support from the majority of states,9 Pennsylvania
continued to look favorably upon the Act and thus, did not repeal its
Arbitration Act of 1927.10

Eventually, the nationwide opposition toward arbitration dissipated,
and in 1955, the National Conference drafted the current Uniform
Arbitration Act [hereinafter U.A.A.]."
Showing its support of
arbitration, Pennsylvania adopted the more current U.A.A. in 1980.12
While the U.A.A. promotes the resolution of disputes in a nonjudicial

7. See id.

8. Arbitration Act of April 25, 1927, 1927 Pa. Laws 381, repealed by Uniform Arbitration
Act of 1980, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7362 (1990).

9.

See Berge, supra note 1, at 305.

10. Herbert L. Sherman, Jr., Analysis of Pennsylvania's Arbitration Act ofl980, 43 U. PITT.
L. REV. 363, 364 (1982).

11. See Barnes, supra, note 1, at 471 (citing Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4
(1978)).
12. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-62 (1990 & Supp. 1993). In addition to
Pennsylvania, thirty-four other states have adopted the Act. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§
09.43.010-.180 (1983 & Supp. 1993); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 - 12-1518 (1989 &
Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 - 16-108-224 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 - 13-22-223 (1987 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-725
(1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 - 16-4319 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West
1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 - 7-922 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 710, para. 5 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE §§ 679A.1-.19 (1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422(1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.024 (Baldwin 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927- 49 (West 1978); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201
- 3-234 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001.5035 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-30 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
435.350-.470 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 - 27-5-324 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 252601 - 25-2622 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.015-.205 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 44-7-22 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1-.20 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§
801-18 (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1548-10 - 15-48-240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1987 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 29-5-320 (Supp. 1993); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (West 1973 & Supp. 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-! to -20 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651- 81 (Supp. 1993); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01-.016 (Michie 1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 - 1-36-119 (1988).
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forum, 3 the Act still provides for the judiciary's role in compelling or
staying arbitration proceedings. 4
This article will examine the impact of the judiciary's role under
Pennsylvania's adoption of the U.A.A. Particular focus will be given
to public employment contexts in which one of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement petitions the court either to compelor
to stay the arbitration of its grievances. " This article will also
examine the way courts have attempted to reconcile this judicial
authority with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Public Employee
Relations Act [hereinafter PERA].' 6
Accordingly, Part II of this article will explain the judiciary's
authority under the U.A.A., while Part III will interpret that authority
within the context of PERA and public employment grievance
arbitrations. Finally, Part IV will evaluate the appropriateness of the
courts' power to compel or stay public employment grievance
arbitrations.
II. Judicial Authority Under the U.A.A.
The centerpiece of the U.A.A. lies in its validation of agreements
to arbitrate. It states, "[a] written agreement to subject any existing
controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written agreement to
submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable."' 7

13. Pennsylvania has long favored arbitration as an efficient means of dispute resolution. See
Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members of State Colleges in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. Scanlon, 446 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1983); Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter
Corp., 331 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1975); Washington Arbitration Case, 259 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1969).
Additionally, throughout the nation, arbitration is preferred as a matter of public policy because
it is more informal, speedy, and inexpensive than litigation. See Red Carpet Armory Realty Co.
v. Golden West Realty, 644 P.2d 93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Wales v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 559 P.2d 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); City of Lenexa v. C.L. Fairley Constr. Co., Inc., 777
P.2d 851 (Kan. 1989); Eric A. Carlstrom Constr. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 256 N.W.2d 479
(Minn. 1977); AFSCME Dist. Council v. Independent Sch. Dist., 351 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co., 685 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Thomas
v. Howard, 276 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Northern Supply Co. v. Town of Greybull, 560
P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 1977).
14. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7304 (1990).
15. The U.A.A. affords the courts additional power to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration
awards. See id. §§ 7313-7315. However, this judicial authority will not be discussed in this
Article.
16. Public Employe Relations Act of 1970, 1970 Pa. Laws 563 (current version at 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (1990)).
17. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7303 (1990).
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Consequently, under the U.A.A., judicial power to compel or to
stay arbitrations is predicated upon the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. Pursuant to section 7304(a) of the Act, parties petitioning the
court to compel arbitration must establish (1) that there was an
agreement to arbitrate the particular dispute at hand and (2) that the
opposing party refused to arbitrate."S Only upon a showing of both of
those factors will the courts validate the arbitration agreement and order
the parties to engage in arbitration proceedings. 9
Conversely, the court "must stay an arbitration on a showing that
there is no agreement to arbitrate" pursuant to section 7304(b).2"
Therefore, a party who opposes arbitration and petitions the court to
enjoin arbitration proceedings must prove that there was never any
consent between the parties to arbitrate the particular dispute at hand.2
III. The U.A.A. in Public Labor Contexts
Pennsylvania's public labor law is embodied in PERA.22 In
particular, PERA grants public employees23 the right to organize

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at § 7304(a).

Id.
Id. at § 7304(b).
See id.

22. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.01.-1101.2301 (1990) [hereinafter PERA]. The public
policy underlying PERA is:
to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their
employees subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this
Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare.
Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its employes are injurious to the
public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate means must be
established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution. Within the
limitations imposed upon the governmental processes by these rights of the public at
large and recognizing that harmonious relationships are required between the public
employer and its employes, the General Assembly has determined that the overall
policy may best be accomplished by (1)granting to public employes the right to
organize and choose freely their representatives; (2) requiring public employers to
negotiate and bargain with employe organizations representing public employes and to
enter into written agreements evidencing the result of such bargaining; and (3)
establishing procedures to provide for the protection of the rights of the public employe,
the public employer and the public at large.
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.101 (1990).
23.

PERA defines a public employer as:

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including school districts
and any officer, board, commission, agency, authority, or other instrumentality thereof
and any nonprofit organization or institution and any charitable, religious, scientific,
literary, recreational, health, educational or welfare institution receiving grants or
appropriations from local, State or Federal governments ...
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.301(1) (1990). A public employee is an individual employed by a state
public employer. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.301(2) (1982). Note, however, that PERA's

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCE ARBITRATIONS

employee organizations for the purpose of collectively bargaining with
their employers over "matters affecting wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment."24 Under PERA, the collective bargaining
process is represented ultimately by the collective bargaining agreement,
a document signifying the specific terms and conditions of employment
accepted by both parties. 5 PERA further provides that disputes
concerning the terms of the collective bargaining agreement are to be
resolved through arbitration. As stated by section 903, "[a]rbitration of
disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory."2 6 Accordingly,
PERA designates that all collective bargaining agreements must contain
provisos explicitly manifesting the parties' intent that disputes pertaining
to the terms of their collective bargaining agreements will proceed to
arbitration.

definition of a public employee does not include elected officials, appointees of the Governor,
management level employees, police, firemen, and clergy or anyone associated or employed by
facilities with a religious purpose. Id.
The Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, also known as Act 111,affords police
and firemen the right to form labor organizations and collectively bargain for wages and terms of
employment. 43 PA. STAT. ANN.§§ 217.1-218 (1990). Unlike PERA public employees, however,
police and firemen are not allowed to strike. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 215.2 (1982). See also, 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (1982) (granting PERA public employees the right to strike until that
strike poses a clear and present danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public). Rather,
police and firemen who reach an impasse in negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement
must submit their disputes to binding interest arbitration. See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 217.4
(1990) (allowing parties at impasse to seek interest arbitration); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 217.7 (1982)
(stating that the decision derived from interest arbitration shall be binding). For a definition of
interest arbitration, see infra note 26.
24. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.701, 1101.401 (1982) (granting public employes rights to
organize, join, collectively bargain, and assist in employee organizations).
25. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.901 (1982) (requiring that parties to a collective
bargaining execute a written contract documenting the parties' agreement to the terms and
conditions of employment).
26. Id. at § 1101.903 (emphasis added). Grievance arbitration under § 1101.903 of PERA
must be distinguished from interest arbitration. Grievance arbitration is a means of resolving labor
disputes pertaining to the terms of an already-existing collective bargaining agreement. Interest
arbitration refers to instances where labor parties are at an impasse in their negotiations to
construct a collective bargaining agreement. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.804 (1982) (providing
an opportunity for PERA employers and employees to voluntarily agree to non-binding arbitration
when at an impasse in negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement). But see 43 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 217.4 (1990) (mandating that police and firemen and their employers submit to binding
arbitration when at impasse in negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement).. Cases
concerning interest arbitration are beyond the scope of this article.
27. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.903 (1990) ("Mhe [mandatory grievance] procedure is
a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a binding
decision by an arbitrator ...
.").
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Moreover, arbitration of disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements is also endorsed by Pennsylvania's U.A.A.
Section 7302(b) of the Act specifically contemplates that it "shall apply
to a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate controversies between
employers and employees or their respective representatives." 2
Section 7302(b), however, also stipulates that the U.A.A. applies to
collective bargaining agreements "only where the arbitrationpursuant
to this subchapter is consistent with any statute regulating labor and
management relations."29 Thus, to assess whether courts have the
jurisdiction to compel or stay public labor arbitrations pursuant to the
U.A.A., one must determine whether this authority is consistent with
PERA. The following two sections analyze the relationship between
PERA and the judiciary's authority to compel or to stay labor
arbitrations under the U.A.A. a°

28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (1990). Unlike Pennsylvania, however, some states
exclude labor contracts from the purview of the U.A.A. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010
(1983); IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1990); IOWA CODE § 679A.1(2)(b) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5401(c) (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.050 (Baldwin 1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-206(b) (1989); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1567.2(b)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 818 (West 1993); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
224 (West 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5653 (Supp. 1993).
29. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (1990) (emphasis added).
30. Professor Herbert L. Sherman, in a law review article, contended that the provisions
within the U.A.A. were too inconsistent with the normal ,labor arbitration procedures prescribed
by PERA for the U.A.A. to have been intended to apply to public labor contexts, especially those
concerning labor relations with political subdivisions. As such, he predicted that to apply the
U.A.A. to public labor arbitration proceedings, would "disrupt well-established labor arbitration
procedures." Sherman, supra note 10, at 398.
Sherman supported his position with an analysis of the statutory language of the U.A.A.
Sherman noted that Pennsylvania did not enact the Model U.A.A.'s repealer provision, which states
that "[a]ll acts or parts of act which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby
repealed."' Id.at 372 (citing Uniform Arbitration Act § 24, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978)). Sherman further
noted that section 7302(b) of Pennsylvania's U.A.A. indicates that arbitration administered under
the U.A.A. is only to occur when this subchapter is consistent with other statutes regulating labor
relations. A reading of this statutory language, in his view, appears to indicate that labor laws
such as PERA would take precedence over the U.A.A. Id.
Sherman's argument becomes even more compelling, considering that the other states that
have adopted the U.A.A. have either expressly included or excluded labor arbitrations from the
purview of the Act. See supra note 28. Pennsylvania is the only state that provides for a qualified
application of the U.A.A. to labor contexts. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (1990).
Conceivably, in making such a stipulation, the legislature intended that the U.A.A. apply to private
labor arbitrations. In light of the already-existing arbitration mandate found in § 903 of PERA,
however, the legislature thus made the U.A.A. applicable to public labor, so long as it does not
conflict with PERA. See generally 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (1990).
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A. Compelling Arbitrations
In light of PERA's section 903, the judiciary's authority to compel
arbitration pursuant to the U.A.A. could be understood to buttress
PERA's preference for arbitration. However, there is little, if any, case
law in which parties have sought the courts' authority under the U.A.A.
to compel grievance arbitration. In this regard, it may be instructive
to note three cases rendered prior to the 1980 enactment of the U.A.A.
In these cases, unions successfully sought orders in equity or in
mandamus to compel their employers to participate in arbitration.
In Milberry v. Board of Education,3' a union sought an order in
equity seeking a ruling requiring the Philadelphia Board of Education
to arbitrate a grievance concerning a tenured teacher's unsatisfactory
rating. Likewise, in 1978, a union brought an equity action to compel
the city of Pittsburgh to arbitrate an employee's disputed dismissal in
Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of
Pittsburgh.32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the employers
to arbitrate in both cases.33 Since both of the actions were decided
prior to 1980 and the enactment of the U.A.A, the Arbitration Act of
1927 was still in effect. Nonetheless, there was no discussion within
the decision as to whether the court was using its authority under the
Arbitration Act of 1927 to compel arbitration proceedings. 34
In Rylke v. Portage,35 a union sought an order in mandamus to
compel the district to arbitrate the grievances of three suspended
teachers. The collective bargaining agreement incorporated certain
provisions of the Public School Code, including the section of the
School Code which granted job security provisions for suspended
teachers. 36 Thus, the union asserted that the teachers' suspensions
were an issue arising under the collective bargaining agreement.37

31. 354 A.2d 559 (Pa. 1976).
32. 391 A.2d 1318 (Pa. 1978).
33. See id. See also Milberry, 354 A.2d at 559.
34. See 391 A.2d 1318. Seemingly, the judiciary did have the power to compel arbitration
under the Arbitration Act of 1927. Pursuant to § 163 of the Arbitration Act, parties seeking an
order to compel arbitration could petition the court to show cause why the arbitration should not
proceed as provided for within the parties' labor agreement. Arbitration Act of 1927, 5 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 163, repealed by Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7304(a) (1990).
After ruling the party opposing arbitration to answer the petition, the court would make an order
as to whether the parties agreed upon and should proceed with arbitration as the means for
resolving their dispute. Id.
35. 375 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1977).
36. Id. at 693.
37. Id.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed the mandamus action
holding that "[m]andamus will only lie when there is no other legal
remedy .

.

.

and the act requested is purely ministerial and not

discretionary."3'
The court found that the grievance was arbitrable
since a teacher's suspension was a dispute arising under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.39
Therefore, the district had a
ministerial duty, under section 903 of PERA, to submit the dispute to
arbitration. In addition, there was no other remedy available at law. In
this case, the parties contractually agreed that arbitration was their sole
remedy.4" Thus, mandamus was a proper cause of action.4' Notably,
like Milberry and PittsburghJoint Collective BargainingCommittee, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the employer to arbitrate.
However, there was no discussion regarding the questions of whether
the refusal to arbitrate was arguably an unfair labor practice, 2 or
whether the court had jurisdiction under the 1927 Arbitration Act to
issue a mandamus order. The court simply relied on section 903 of
PERA to compel the arbitration of the grievance.43
Although rendered prior to the U.A.A., Milberry, PittsburghJoint
Collective Bargaining Committee, and Rylke were decided after the
adoption of PERA. PERA establishes the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter PLRB] as the forum for which parties injured by
unfair labor practices can seek a remedy.4 4 Thus, it is interesting to
note that in Rylke and PittsburghJoint Collective BargainingCommittee
the court and the parties apparently assumed that the court had
jurisdiction to compel arbitration in spite of the fact that failure to
arbitrate a grievance is arguably an unfair labor practice4 ' and that the
PLRB was established to provide remedies for unfair labor practices.
Moreover, section 1301 of PERA gives the PLRB exclusive jurisdiction
to ascertain whether certain actions constitute unfair labor practices and
to prescribe remedies to parties victimized by these practices.46
Specifically, section 1301 provides that "[t]he board is empowered ...
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ....

38. Id. at 696.
39. Id.
40. See 375 A.2d at 696.
41. Id.
42. See discussion infra part III.B.
43. Rylke, 375 A.2d at 695.
44. See PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (1990).
45. See discussion infra part III.B.
46. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §1101.1301 (1990). See also id. at § 1101.1201 (enumerating actions
constituting unfair labor practices).
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This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment orprevention that have been or may be established
'
by agreement, law, or otherwise."47

Case law has held that a party's-refusal to proceed with grievance
arbitration consititutes an unfair labor practice. Thus, the PLRB can
compel the party to arbitrate as a means of preventing the continuation
of its unfair practice.4 8

Accordingly,

those seeking to compel

grievance arbitration can file an unfair labor practice charge with the
PLRB. As shown by Milberry, PittsburghJoint Collective Bargaining

Committee, and Rylke, parties seeking to compel arbitration typically are
unions. If the PLRB determines that the disputed issue is arguably
arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement, the PLRB will

charge the refusing party, usually the employer, with an unfair labor
practice and will direct the parties to arbitrate.
Hence, in analyzing both the power of the PLRB and the
judiciary's authority to compel arbitration, PERA and the U.A.A. may
have overlapping provisions that can be used to achieve the same end.
Given the limited number of cases in which unions have sought the

courts' authority to compel arbitration either before or after the
enactment of the U.A.A., it appears that parties generally have assumed
that pursuant to section 1301 of PERA, the PLRB has exclusive

jurisdiction to determine whether a refusal to arbitrate is an unfair labor
practice. Consequently, parties may have assumed that courts lack
jurisdiction to compel arbitrations under the U.A.A. and may have
sought relief from the PLRB instead. Based on the latest decisions of
the Commonwealth Court, however, this assumption may not be correct.4 9

47.

Id. at § 1101.1301 (emphasis added).

48. See, e.g., PLRB v. Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. 451 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1982); University of
Pittsburgh Western Psychiatric Institute & Clinic v. PLRB, 578 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990);
East Pennsboro Area Sch. Dist. v. PLRB, 467 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Commw. 1983); North Star Sch.
Dist. v. PLRB, 386 A.2d 1059 (Pa. Commw. 1978); APSCUF v. PLRB, 373 A.2d 1175 (Pa.
Commw. 1977). Specifically, such case law has held that an employer's refusal to proceed to
grievance arbitration is a violation of 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1201(a)(5).
Section
1101.1201(a)(5) provides that:
(a) Public employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe
representative which is the exclusive representative of employees in an
appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances
with the exclusive representative.
43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 0l01.1201(a)(5) (1990).
49. See infra notes 65-138 and accompanying text. If these Commonwealth Court decisions
are correct, then it would seem obvious that unions may skip unfair labor practice proceedings
before the PLRB to obtain arbitration if they wish, and instead seek an order from the courts
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B. Staying Arbitration
Invariably, parties, usually employers, will oppose grievance
arbitration, contending that the issue in dispute is not within the scope
of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, is not arbitrable.
Acknowledging PERA's strong language favoring arbitration, courts
have held that questions concerning arbitrability of issues are first to be
determined within arbitration proceedings since "the scope of the
grievance arbitration procedure is for the arbitrator, at least in the first
instance."50 Thereafter, if the arbitrator deems the issue arbitrable and
continues the proceedings, the parties who had originally objected to the
arbitration may seek an appeal of the arbitrator's determination.
On the other hand, parties opposing arbitration have attempted to
circumvent the "arbitration in the first instance" precept by utilizing the
court's authority to stay arbitration pursuant to the U.A.A. It is this
power to stay under the U.A.A. that may be read as conflicting with
PERA's arbitration mandate.
In a number of recent cases, however, the Commonwealth Court
has maintained the position that the two Acts are not inconsistent, and
in fact, can be harmonized. 5 Therefore, it appears that petitioning the
court to stay arbitration under the U.A.A. is currently a viable strategy
for parties opposing grievance arbitration.
1. Early cases supporting the "arbitrationin the first instance"
precept.-Until recently, there was little reason to believe that parties
could successfully enjoin a public sector arbitration under the U.A.A.
It was undoubtedly believed by many practitioners that a court could
not logically enjoin an arbitration without adjudicating the issue of
substantive arbitrability and without determining whether the refusal to
arbitrate was arguably an unfair labor practice. These assumptions were
based upon a number of decisions that seemed to hold that
determination of the former question was, in the first instance, for the
arbitrator to decide and determination of the latter issue was exclusively
for the PLRB pursuant to section 1301 of PERA.

compelling arbitration, just as employers may seek an order staying arbitration under the U.AA.
50. See, e.g., Neshaminy Fed'n of Teachers v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 462 A.2d 629 (Pa.
1983); PLRB v. Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist., 451 A.2d 671, 672 (Pa. 1982); Pittsburgh Joint
Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 391 A.2d 1318, 1323 (Pa. 1978); Board of
Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 3, 346 A.2d 35, 41 n.13 (Pa. 1975); East
Pennsboro Area Sch. Dist. v. PLRB, 467 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
51. See infra notes 63-137 and accompanying text.
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The notion that the arbitrability of an issue is for the arbitrator, at
least in the first instance, has been based upon the rationale originally
developed in the Steelworker's Trilogy. 2 In the Trilogy, the U.S.
Supreme Court asserted that "courts .. . have no business weighing the

merits of a grievance."53 Recognizing that the uniqueness of collective
bargaining agreements required a means and scope of interpretation
different from that applied to ordinary contracts, the Court emphasized
that dispute resolution by an arbitrator was the most effective means to
accomodate the peculiarities of collective bargaining agreements.54 As
a result, the Court held that, except where the agreement expressly
excludes the dispute from arbitration, the grievance procedure set up
during the collective bargaining process should prevail, no matter how
frivolous the grievance."
The Trilogy concerned private sector employment contexts.
Pennsylvania, however, later adopted the Trilogy rationale for the public
employment sector in several cases including, Board of Education v.
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Local No. 3,56 Pittsburgh Joint
Collective BargainingCommittee v. City of Pittsburgh,57 PLRB v. Bald
Eagle School District,58 Neshaminy Federation of Teachers v.

52. The cases comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy include United Steelworkers of America
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564. (1960); United Steelworker of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. 577 (1960); United Steelworker of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
53. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568.
54. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 579-82. The Court described a collective
bargaining agreement in the following manner: "The collective bargaining agreement states the
rights and duties of the parties. It is more than a contract .... A collective bargaining agreement
is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government." Id.at 578-80.
55. Id.at 579-83. The Court equated the collective bargaining process as a system of
industrial self-government. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
For this reason, the Court premised its finding of arbitration as the best means for resolution
of contract disputes upon its view of arbitration as, essentially, an extension of the collective
bargaining agreement. 363 U.S. at 581. Specifically, the Court noted:
[The grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart
of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the
unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise
and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant
needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement .... The grievance procedure is, in other words, a
part of the continuous collective bargaining process.
Id.
56. 346 A.2d 35 (Pa. 1975).
57. 391 A.2d 1318 (Pa. 1978).
58. 451 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1982).
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59 and East Pennsboro
Neshaminy School District,
Area School District
6
v. PLRB. " In these cases, Pennsylvania courts acknowledged that,
given the arbitration mandate found in section 903 of PERA,
Pennsylvania public labor policy's espousal of arbitration was even
stronger than that of federal labor law.6 Consequently, it would be
totally inconsistent for Pennsylvania courts to be less supportive of
grievance arbitration than federal courts. Therefore, the courts strongly
asserted the proposition that substantive arbitrability questions are, in
the first instance, to be determined by the arbitrator and not the
courts.

6 2

Following this line of precedent is Petition of Woodland Hills
School District.63 In Woodland Hills, the union requested arbitration
of a grievance challenging the district for selecting a non-union member
for a coaching position. The district petitioned the common pleas court

59. 462 A.2d 629 (Pa. 1983).
60. 467 A.2d 1356 (Pt, Commw. Ct 1983).
61. For instance, unlike PERA, the National Labor Relations Act, an act governing federal
private labor law does not provide for compulsory grievance arbitration. See National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1973 & Supp. 1994).
62. This proposition was eloquently asserted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PLRB
v. Bald Eagle Sch. Dist., 451 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1982). In Bald Eagle School District, a school district
and the teachers union were in dispute as to whether striking teachers were entitled to certain days
of payment when the collective bargaining agreement called for a maximum of 183 days of school
instruction and the school district provided a calendar of only 180 days. Id. at 672. The union
filed a grievance and when the district refused to arbitrate, filed an unfair labor practice with the
PLRB. The PLRB determined the matter a proper subject for arbitration and issued an order
directing the district to arbitrate. Id. The district appealed the order to the common pleas court.
On appeal, both the common pleas and Commonwealth courts found the issue not arbitrable and
reversed the PLRB's order. Id. Acknowledging the importance of prompt disposition of disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth
Court decision. Id. at 674. The court held that:
[t]he wisdom of the policy favoring arbitration of grievances arising under a collective
bargaining agreement and the folly of permitting a full preliminary bout in the courts
over the issue of an arbitrator's jurisdiction is demonstrated by this case. We find it
absurd that, after six years, the substantive issue of one day's pay for the Bald Eagle
Area teachers has not been determined while the courts yet another time have examined
the PERA policy favoring arbitration.
Furthermore, today's decision only returns the issue to the [arbitration] forum
where it should have been decided at the outset; it obviously leaves open the possibility
of additional review. However, were we to decide otherwise we would only encourage
potential parties to such disputes to continue to follow the practice of preliminarily
litigating through one forum the power of another to decide the substantive issue. We
condemn that practice and hold that hereafter issues involving conflicts between a
public sector collective bargaining agreement and fundamental statutory policies of this
Commonwealth must be presented first to arbitration for determination, subject to
appropriate court review of any award in conflict with such policies.
Id. at 673-74.
63. 473 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
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to stay the arbitration proceedings. The reported opinion does not
indicate whether the district was invoking the court's power under the
U.A.A. to stay the proceedings. Nonetheless, relying on Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers and Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining
Committee and their progeny, both the common pleas and
Commonwealth courts denied the stay, holding that the question of
whether the grievance fell within the scope of the collective bargaining
agreement was initally a question for the arbitrator, not for the
courts. 6 4

Case law also supported the proposition that a determination
of
whether a party's refusal to arbitrate constitutes an unfair labor practice
alone. As stated in Hollinger v. Department of
is vested in the 6PLRB
5
Public Welfare:
[I]f a party directly seeks redress of conduct which arguably
constitutes one of the unfair labor practices listed in Article XII
(Section 1201) of PERA . . ., jurisdiction to determine whether an
unfair labor practice has indeed occurred and if so, to prevent a
party from continuing the practice is in the PLRB, and nowhere
else.66

Following Hollinger, courts have held that they lack equity jurisdiction
to enjoin the arbitration process because a party's refusal to arbitrate is
arguably an unfair labor practice and the jurisdiction to resolve such
disputes lies exclusively with the PLRB.67
For example, in School District of Penn Hills v. Penn Hills
Education Association,68 the district refused to arbitrate a grievance
concerning the district's alleged discriminatory acts toward the
Association's local president. The union then filed a complaint with the
PLRB, alleging the district's failure to arbitrate the grievance was an
unfair labor practice. Prior to the PLRB's issuance of an order,
however, the district filed a complaint in equity with the common pleas
court to enjoin the Association from arbitrating the grievance.69
The common pleas court granted the preliminary injunction, and
On appeal, the
the union subsequently appealed the order.70
Commonwealth Court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 259.
365 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1976).
Id. at 1249 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
383 A.2d 1301 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
Id. at 1302.
Id.
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grant the injunction because the failure to arbitrate a grievance is an
unfair labor practice and, pursuant to Hollinger,jurisdiction to resolve
such disputes lies exclusively with the PLRB.7"
Similarly, in Koch v. Bellefonte Area School District," when the
union proceeded to arbitrate a grievance, the district filed a complaint
in equity, seeking to enjoin the arbitration proceedings. The lower court
Yet, following both Penn Hills and
granted the injunction.73
Hollinger, the Commonwealth Court reversed the order, claiming that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to prevent the arbitration, because
the district's refusal to arbitrate was arguably an unfair labor practice
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB.74
It must be noted that Hollinger, Penn Hills, and Koch were decided
prior to 1980 and the enactment of the U.A.A. Still, even under the
Arbitration Act of 1927, the courts had the authority to dismiss
arbitration proceedings."' Nevertheless, as shown by Hollinger and its
progeny, the courts acknowledged the PLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to
determine unfair labor practices and thought the ability to prevent such
practices was better placed with the PLRB. Consequently, such
decisions are still significant today, even after the enactment of the
Moreover, in a post-U.A.A. case, it seemed as if the
U.A.A.
Commonwealth Court's position regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of
the PLRB had not changed. 76
In Alliston v. City of Allentown,"' a case concerning the
confirmation of an arbitration award, the Commonwealth Court again
held that the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction in the prevention of unfair
labor practices. In Alliston, the city failed to honor an arbitration award
in favor of the plaintiff, Alliston. The city had never sought to vacate,
modify, or correct the award, as provided for under the U.A.A.7"

71. Id.at 1303.
72. 388 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1115.
75. Parties seeking to compel arbitration could seek a court order under § 163 of the
Arbitration Act of 1927. See supra note 34. Upon consideration of both parties' responses, the
court was to ascertain whether both parties had agreed to arbitrate. If the court determined that
the agreement to arbitrate was indeed a disputed issue, the issue would proceed summarily to trial.
The parties did have the option of a jury trial. If at trial, the jury or court determined that there
was no such agreement to arbitrate, the court would dismiss the arbitration proceedings.
Arbitration Act of April 25, 1927, 5 PA. STAT. ANN. § 163, repealed by Uniform Arbitration Act
of 1980, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7304(b).
76. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
77. 455 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Thus, Alliston sought the money allocated to him in the arbitration
award by petitioning the court to confirm the award pursuant to section
7313 of the U.A.A. 79 The court refused, holding that since the city's
failure to honor the award was arguably an unfair labor practice, only
the PLRB had jurisdiction to prevent the city's practice and thus, the
court lacked jurisdiction over such an issue."0
Because a party's failure to participate in arbitration proceedings
is arguably an unfair labor practice and, pursuant to Hollinger and its
progeny, only the PLRB has jurisdiction to assess and prevent unfair
labor practices, it would seem that the courts lack the jurisdiction to
stay public labor arbitrations under the U.A.A. However, since 1989,
the Commonwealth Court has held that such assumptions regarding the
exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB are incorrect. Indeed, in upholding
the judiciary's authority to stay labor arbitrations, the Commonwealth
Court has retreated from case law holding that (1) determinations of
arbitrability belong to the arbitrator in the first instance and (2) the
PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor
practices.
2. Cases Establishing a Court's Jurisdiction to Stay Arbitrations
Under the UA.A.-The first reported case in which the Commonwealth
Court affirmatively established a court's authority to stay public labor
arbitrations under the U.A.A. was Mifflin County School District v.
Lutz.8 1 In Mifflin County, the union filed a grievance challenging a
temporary professional employee's dismissal after receiving an
unsatisfactory rating. The collective bargaining agreement expressly
stated that a claim involving teacher ratings could not be grieved. 2
The union argued that the grievance was, nonetheless, arbitrable
because "discipline" was arbitrable under the contract. 3 The district,
relying on the express language of the contract, petitioned for and
received a stay of arbitration proceedings.8
The Commonwealth Court determined that since the collective
bargaining agreement expressly prohibited arbitration as a potential
79. 455 A.2d at 239.
80. Alliston, 455 A.2d at 243. Aliston cannot be reconciled with the cases discussed
immediately below. See infra notes 81-138 and accompanying text. If the PLRB does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in cases where an employer seeks to enjoin an arbitration under the U.A.A.,
then it would be manifestly unfair to deprive a union of the right to confirm an arbitration award
under the same Act, but instead require the union to proceed administratively before the PLRB.
81. 551 A.2d 396 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 565 A.2d 446 (Pa. 1989).
82. Id. at 397.
83. Id.

84. Id.
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remedy for the teacher's dispute, the lower court had the authority to
issue an order staying arbitration proceedings.8" Although it did not
explicitly discuss the question, it appears that the court believed that
under the contractual language it was not even arguable that the contract
contemplated arbitration of this issue. Therefore, the court concluded
that the employer was not guilty of an unfair labor practice. 6
In the litigation following Mifflin County, questions concerning the
inconsistency .between PERA's section 903 and section 1301 on the one
hand and section 7304(b) of the U.A.A. on the other, were expressly
raised. As the cases unfolded, however, the courts rejected those
arguments that claimed the two acts were inconsistent, and instead
chose to reconcile them.
In Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School Education
Association v. The Executive Council of Middle Bucks Area VocationalTechnical School, 7 a teacher was dismissed following a hearing by his
employer, the Executive Council. The employee did not appeal the
adjudication, but instead filed a grievance, intending to proceed to
arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.88
The Council contended that the School Code's appeal procedure was
the exclusive means for the teacher to challenge his dismissal.8 9
Consequently, the Council petitioned to stay the proceedings on the
ground that there was no agreement to arbitrate dismissal issues.9 °
The trial court, concluding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate
teacher dismissals, stayed the arbitration proceedings. 9'
On appeal, the teacher asserted that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to enter a stay because section 903 of PERA compels the
submission of all disputes arising out of a collective bargaining
agreement. 92 The teacher further contended that a determination of
arbitrability of an issue is in the first instance one for the arbitrator, not
the courts.93
In its opinion, the Commonwealth Court acknowledged the
potential conflict between PERA and the U.A.A. 94 Nevertheless, the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

551 A.2d at 397, 398.
Id. at 398.
552 A.2d 763 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), allocatur denied, 562 A.2d 828 (Pa. 1989).
552 A.2d at 764.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
552 A.2d at 765.
Id.
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court felt that the apparent conflict could be reconciled and held that a
trial court does have the authority to stay arbitration under the U.A.A.
"if the relevant collective bargaining agreement prohibits arbitration as
a potential remedy for the dispute."95 Further, the court stated that
PERA, itself, is silent as to who determines whether the dispute is
arbitrable, while the U.A.A. expressly permits a trial court to stay an
arbitration based upon its determination that there is no agreement to
arbitrate a disputed issue.96 Thus, the court determined that it was
compelled to honor the specific language of the U.A.A. and affirmed
the trial court's ruling.97
The court, however, pointed out that its decision did not mean that
arbitrators no longer had the authority to determine whether issues are
arbitrable once the parties are before them.9" Rather, it found that
section 7304 is merely a preemptive measure.99 As such, section
7304(b) allows parties to receive a preliminary determination from the
courts of whether an issue is arbitrable under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. But when a court denies a party's motion for a
stay and subsequently directs it to arbitrate, the arbitrator's
determination regarding the arbitrability of the disputed issue then
becomes controlling. 00
In a similar case, In re Glover,'0 ' the potential conflict between
section 903 and section 7304(b) was further discussed. In Glover, a
coach processed a grievance and progressed to arbitration.
Simultaneously, the district, claiming the issue was non-arbitrable, filed
a petition in the common pleas court to enjoin the arbitration. ,02The
trial court determined that Glover's coaching status did not qualify him
as an "employee" and therefore, did not entitle him to the use of the
grievance procedure.'0 3 As a result, the trial court, relying upon

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.The court was apparently influenced by federal court decisions holding that the courts
have the duty to determine whether collective bargaining agreements evidence an intent to arbitrate
the particular grievance at issue, even if, in doing so, the courts must determine the merits of the
grievance. The court specifically cited AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986). 555 A.2d at 765. See also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, I I!
S. Ct. 2215 (1991) (stating that it is the court's duty to determine whether a party is bound to
arbitrate).
98. 552 A.2d at 765.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 587 A.2d 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), allocatur denied, 598 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1991).
102. 587 A.2d at 26.
103. Id.
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Middle Bucks' 0validation
of its authority under section 7304(b), stayed
4
the arbitration.
Glover appealed, asserting that Middle Bucks was inconsistent with
Hollinger v. Department of Public Welfare. "' . Specifically, Glover
contended that the refusal to arbitrate is arguably an unfair labor
practice under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB. °6 Thus, the
PLRB, not the trial court, should determine whether arbitration
proceedings are required. 7
Unpersuaded, the Commonwealth Court rejected Glover's
argument, stating that Hollinger and Middle Bucks were not
inconsistent. 'O The court held that Middle Bucks applied merely to
the threshold question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. 0 9
If the court finds that no such agreement exists, only then is the court
authorized by the U.A.A. to stay arbitration. Conversely, if an
agreement does exist, then section 903 of PERA requires the parties to
proceed with arbitration. If the party opposing arbitration still refuses
to participate in the proceedings, then, applying Hollinger and its
progeny, the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to find the party's refusal
to be an unfair labor practice and direct it to arbitrate.''
3. Cases Defining the Parameters of the Court's Authority to Stay
Arbitration Under the UA.A.-Mifflin County, Middle Bucks, and
Glover have established that courts have jurisdiction to stay public labor
grievance arbitrations pursuant to the U.A.A. In the most recent
litigation concerning the U.A.A., however, this jurisdiction seems to
have been sharply circumscribed."'
At this time, the major case establishing the guidelines that courts
must follow when determining whether to stay arbitrations is
Phoenixville School District v. Phoenixville Area Education
Association." 2 In Phoenixville, a teacher dismissed from employment
elected to use the grievance process as opposed to the hearing
procedures set forth by the School Code. The district petitioned for a

104. Id.
105. 365 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1976). See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
106. Glover, 587 A.2d at 27.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. It may be that the Commonwealth Court is beginning to recognize the Pandora's Box that
it may have opened. See discussion infra parts III.B.3 & IV.
112. 624 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
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stay of the arbitration proceedings, claiming that teacher dismissals were
not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. "3
In this case, the collective bargaining agreement did not
specifically exclude teacher dismissals from its established grievance
procedure; rather, the provision outlining the grievance procedure could
have been interpreted to encompass the teacher's dismissal. "" The
trial court granted the stay, and the Association appealed the order,
taking the position that unless a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement specifically provides that a disputed issue is not subject to
the grievance procedures, then it is legitimately arbitrable. 5
The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Association, holding
that "a trial court should not enjoin arbitration unless it can be said with
certainty that the agreement does not cover the dispute."" 6
In
essence, the court's standard was predicated upon section 903 of PERA,
which indicates that arbitration is mandatory if it arises out of the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. "' Thus, reading
both the U.A.A. and PERA together, the court set forth the following
as a framework for the judicial standard of review:
[I]f there is no agreement to arbitrate and an employee attempts to
pursue an inapplicable grievance procedure, a stay of arbitration,
pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, is appropriate.
If,
however, the agreement does not clearly permit or preclude
grievance of the dispute, the provisions of the agreement must be
interpreted to determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.
In that case, a stay is not appropriate, and an arbitrator must
determine whether the dispute is grievable. "

In short, Phoenixville stands for the proposition that where the
arbitrability of the dispute depends upon the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, it cannot be said with certainty that the
agreement does not cover the dispute. Therefore, section 903 mandates
that the determination of arbitrability must be made by an arbitrator.
As a result, the court may not stay the arbitration pursuant to section
7304(b) of the U.A.A." 9

113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1086.
Id.at 1085.

116. Id.(emphasis added). Accord Iowa City Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Assoc.,
343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1983); Clark County Pub. Empl. Assoc. v. Pearson, 798 P.2d 136 (Nev.
1990).
117. Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist., 624 A.2d at 1088.
118. Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 1088.

98

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER

1994

Following Phoenixville, is CentralBucks School Districtv. Central
Bucks Education Association, 20 a case that dramatizes the inherent
potential for jurisdictional conflict between PERA and the U.A.A. In
Central Bucks, the district refused to arbitrate the union's grievance and
petitioned the court for a stay of arbitration. Four days later, the union
filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the PLRB.'' Thus, there
were two simultaneous actions proceeding. The district was petitioning
the court for a stay of arbitration proceedings, while at the same time,
the union was using the PLRB's jurisdiction.
When petitioning the common pleas court for a stay, the district
proffered Middle Bucks and Glover as decisions supporting their
request. 122 However, in the court's opinion, Central Bucks was
distinguishable from Middle Bucks and Glover. According to the court,
the persons seeking a stay in Middle Bucks and Glover were outside of
the class of persons entitled to grievance arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement. 12 On the other hand, in Central Bucks, the
dispute did arise from the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.' 24 Thus, instead of following Middle Bucks and Glover,
the common pleas court opted to adhere to Bald Eagle, one of several
decisions in which the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the "arbitration
in the first instance" precept, 25 and denied the stay. The common
pleas court's denial of the stay was issued prior to the PLRB's
determination of whether the district's refusal to arbitrate the grievance
was an unfair labor practice. When the PLRB eventually decided the
district did commit an unfair practice, 126 the district sought review of
the PLRB's decision by the same common pleas court. The
common
27
pleas court, not suprisingly, affirmed the PLRB's decision.

120.

629 A.2d 196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).

121.
122.

Id. at 197-98.
23 PPER 23064 (Dec. 20, 1991) at 144.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 145.
126. The affirmation of the PLRB decision is published in 144 LRRM (BNA) 2193 (1993).
Judge Rufe of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas wrote the decision.

127. 144 LRRM (BNA) at 2195. As with Judge Beister's decision denying the district's stay
of arbitration, Judge Rufe emphasized Supreme Court decisions such as Bald Eagle and Hollinger,
decisions establishing the strong preference for arbitration. Id. at 2194. Accordingly, the court
affirmed that the PLRB exercised proper jurisdiction in determining whether the district committed
an unfair labor practice when it refused to arbitrate. Id. at 2194-95.
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The district appealed both of the common pleas decisions.2s
Specifically, the district appealed the court's denial of the stay of
arbitration and the court's affirmation of the PLRB's determination that
the district committed an unfair labor practice when it failed to arbitrate
the grievance.'29 Consolidating both appeals, the Commonwealth
Court first used the Phoenixville standard to determine if the common
pleas court erred in failing to stay arbitration proceedings. The court
decided that it could not be said with certainty that the collective
bargaining agreement did not manifest the parties' intent to arbitrate the
30
grievance.
Accordingly, the lower court's denial of the stay was
3
correct.

1

In both of the common pleas court decisions, however, the court
focused upon the notions of arbitrability in the first instance and the
PLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over issues of unfair labor practices. The
Commonwealth Court never addressed these issues.
Rather, it
immediately applied the Phoenixville standard, assuming that it had the
authority under the U.A.A. to stay the arbitration if needed.'
The most recent Commonwealth Court case concerning the court's
jurisdiction to stay arbitrations under the U.A.A. is Chester Upland
School District v. PLRB. 3 1 In Chester Upland, neither party sought
the court's power to stay arbitration under the U.A.A., although the
district may now regret its decision. The case arose after the union
filed a grievance alleging that the district demoted teachers in violation

128. The appeals were taken at significantly different dates. See discussion in section IV
infra.
129. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 629 A.2d at 198.
130. Id. at 200.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 631 A.2d 723 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). Since Chester Upland, there has been a common
pleas court decision involving an employer's attempt to stay arbitration under the U.A.A. This
opinion is consistent with the prior Commonwealth Court decisions. In BLaST Intermediate Unit
No. 17 v. Brauchler, No. 93-02,069 (Lycoming Ct. C.P. Apr. 29, 1994), a school psychologist was
transferred from an intermediate unit to a school district pursuant to the Transfer of Entities Act,
24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1113 (1982). Subsequently, when two positions became available at the unit
and the unit failed to recall the psychclogist for one of the positions, the psychologist filed a
grievance, asserting that the Transfer of Entities Act mandated that the unit provide such recall
rights. Id. The union contended that the psychologist was not entitled to recall rights, as he no
longer was an employee of the unit once he was transferred. Id. To support their positions, each
party supplied reasonable, but varying interpretations of the Act. Id. The court held that he issue
of whether the collective bargaining agreement encompassed the issue, namely whether the
Transfer of Entities Act provides for the psychologist's recall rights, as that concept was
understood under the Act, was an issue open to interpretation. Id. Consequently, relying upon
Phoenixville, the court denied the stay, holding that such interpretation was for the arbitrator in
the first instance. BLaSt Intermediate Unit, No. 93-02,069.
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of seniority provisions. Subsequently, when the union filed an unfair
labor charge with the PLRB after the district refused to arbitrate the
grievance, the PLRB found the district had committed an unfair practice
and directed it to arbitrate. 31 4 The district did not file exceptions to
the order, but rather petitioned the common pleas court for review of
the PLRB decision. The court reversed the order and the PLRB
appealed.' 3 5
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court considered the procedure to
be used by parties opposing the arbitrability of a grievance. The court
held that the only two procedures available for opposing a grievance's
arbitrability are (1) to contest the issue's arbitrability to the arbitrator
during the arbitration of the grievance or (2) to file a petition in the
common pleas court for a stay of the arbitration proceedings. 3 6 The
district followed neither of these two options. Therefore, the trial court
erred in reversing the PLRB order. Furthermore, where a party
exercises neither option and the party has unilaterally refused to proceed
with arbitration, it has committed an unfair labor practice that is to be
37
adjudicated and remedied by the PLRB.
In Chester Upland, the Commonwealth Court offered a summary
of the procedural and jurisdictional parameters which govern disputes
concerning the arbitrability of grievances. These parameters must be
considered the latest authoritative pronouncement on the state of the law
in this area. These parameters are the following:
'to summarize, the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court
are not inconsistent and make clear the procedures and scope of
review in grievance arbitration.
First, the scope of matters to be resolved by grievance arbitration is
in the first instance for the arbitrator to determine. Bald Eagle. An
employer, may, however, file a petition for a stay of arbitration
proceedings under 42 Pa. C.S. § 7304(b) if the employer can show
a substantial, bona fide dispute as to arbitrability. Middle Bucks. If,
on consideration of that stay petition, it can be said with certainty
that the collective bargaining agreement does not address the dispute
which would be arbitrated, the common pleas court may grant a
stay.

Central Bucks School District v. Central Bucks Education

Association _ Pa. Commonwealth Ct. _,
_ A.2d _
(Nos.
73 C.D. 1992 and 569 C.D. 1993, filed July 13, 1992). A trial

134.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 724-25.
136. Id. at 727.
137. Id.
135.
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court should not, however, enjoin arbitration unless "it can be said
with positive assurance that the parties have agreed the dispute is
not subject to arbitration." Phoenixville Area School District v. The
Phoenixville Area Education Association,
Ct. -, 624 A.2d 1983 (1993).

_

Pa. Commonwealth

Second, after arbitration, a party may, on appeal to the common
pleas court, raise the question of arbitrability as a threshold matter
if the question has been raised before the arbitrator. See e.g.,
Harbor Creek [146 Pa. Commw. 631, 606 A.2d 666 (1992)]. If it
is established before the common pleas court that the dispute is not
subject to arbitration, then the court may vacate the arbitration
award. Garnet Valley [128 Pa. Commw. 182, 563 A.2d 207,
(1989)].
Finally, where no stay is sought and an employer does not process
a grievance or otherwise participate in arbitration, the question
before the PLRB is whether the refusal to arbitrate is an unfair labor
practice, and jurisdiction to determine this question is in the PLRB
"and nowhere else." Hollinger. A party cannot unilaterally refuse
to proceed to arbitration, since section 1201(a)(5) of the PERA
makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to arbitrate grievances in
3s
good faith. East Pennsboro."

138. 631 A.2d at 727. Compare the current state of the law expressed in Chester Uplandwith
the conflicting arguments set forth in a recent PLRB decision, Ringgold Educ. Ass'n v. Ringgold
Sch. Dist, 24 PPER 24064 (1993). Factually, Ringgold is analogous to Central Bucks. Ringgold
has the same tandem proceedings, namely that the union filed an unfair labor practice with the
PLRB and the district petitioned the court for a stay of arbitration. The hearing examiner
determined that the district committed an unfair practice in its refusal to arbitrate. Thus, the
district filed exceptions to the decision and Ringgold is the Board's consideration of the district's
exceptions. Id.
The district contended that its decision to seek a stay of arbitration pursuant to the U.A.A.
could not constitute an unfair labor practice. However, as the PLRB pronounced, it was not the
district's decision to file a U.A.A. action that constituted the unfair practice. Rather, at the time
the hearing examiner considered the dispute, the district had failed to arbitrate the grievance, and
it was this failure that constituted the unfair practice. Id. It is unclear from the opinion, whether
the common pleas court had already denied the district's petition for a stay at the time the hearing
examiner made its decision or, if, in the alternative, the common pleas court had yet to make its
decision regarding the stay at the time the hearing examiner made his decision.
In its decision, the PLRB expressly reserved its exclusive jurisdiction to determine unfair
labor practices. Id. In short, it held that the mere fact that an employer has filed for an injunction
to stay arbitration under the U.A.A. does not supersede the PLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to
determine and prevent unfair labor practices. Id.
In reaching this decision, the PLRB relied on such precedent as Hollinger, Penn Hills, and
Koch which affirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB to hear unfair labor practice disputes
under § 1301 of PERA. Id. In addition, the opinion cited Professor Sherman's law review article,
see Sherman, supra note 10, which contends that the U.A.A. was not intended to apply to public
labor contexts.
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IV. Conclusion: Impact of the Judiciary's Authority to Compel and
Stay Arbitrations Under the U.A.A.
In spite of the Commonwealth Court's attempt to reconcile the
cases and the statutes summarized in Chester Upland, serious questions
remain for consideration. In its attempt to reconcile PERA and the
U.A.A., the Commonwealth Court has, de facto, provided for concurrent
jurisdiction between the courts and the PLRB with respect to disputes
regarding compelling or staying grievance arbitrations. Along with this
concurrent jurisdiction come some serious practical problems and
disruption of what, up to 1989, was well-established procedure for
resolving such disputes. The courts' assertion of their power to stay
arbitration under the U.A.A. has created a "race to the courthouse," as
shown by Central Bucks. Unions seeking to compel arbitration can
seek redress in the PLRB, while, simultaneously, employers opposing
arbitration can petition for a stay of arbitration in the common pleas
court. The Commonwealth Court has created a situation where the
PLRB and the common pleas courts can and will reach contradictory
decisions. The Commonwealth Court will ultimately have to reconcile
the decisions, presumably by consolidating appeals. This process would
be awkward, slow, and a potential nightmare for the litigants.
Consider the dual simultaneous proceedings in Central Bucks.'39
On October 11, 1991, the employer petitioned the court for a stay of
arbitration. On October 15, four days later, the union filed an unfair
labor charge with the PLRB. The common pleas court denied the stay
on December 20, 1991 and the employer appealed and filed briefs. On
May 26, 1992, the PLRB issued a final order finding the employer
guilty of an unfair practice and directing it to arbitrate. The employer
appealed the PLRB decision to the common pleas court and, on
February 23, 1993, the court affirmed the PLRB decision.
The
employer appealed this affirmance of the PLRB ruling. Fortunately, the
parties saw the need to consolidate both proceedings and asked the
Commonwealth Court to stay the first appeal until the two appeals
could be consolidated.
This was agreed to and ordered by the
Commonwealth Court.

As Ringgold was decided four months before the Commowealth Court rendered its decision
in Central Bucks, it appears that the PLRB's rationale for exclusive jurisdiction in these matters
has been rejected by the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court, instead has essentially
created concurrent jurisdiction between the courts and the PLRB for determining whether the
refusal to arbitrate is an unfair labor practice. See discussion infra part IV.
139. See generally 629 A.2d 196. See also supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
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The Central Bucks proceedings took a total of two and one half
years. Further, in appealing the PLRB's decision that an unfair practice
was committed, the employer took the appeal to the very same court
that denied its stay petition and directed it to arbitrate six months
earlier.140 Fortunately, the two lower court proceedings reached the
same conclusion, namely that the district should arbitrate the union's
grievance. The time will likely come, however, when such lower court
decisions will be in direct contradiction with one another. 4 Finally,
note that the proceedings, will inevitably reach the Commonwealth
Court at different times. All of this is a waste of time, effort, and
resources and is a trap for unwary litigants.
Arguably, the public policy furthered by PERA has been seriously
compromised. The PLRB was established as an entity that could
efficiently settle disputes between public labor parties. The PLRB was
also created to develop the expertise and the experience to resolve these
disputes consistently and efficiently. 142
Under the recent
Commonwealth Court decisions, that consistency and efficiency may be
jeopardized.
The ultimate validity of these Commonwealth Court decisions
remains undetermined, as none of these decisions have been brought on
appeal before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 43
However, if the

140. See supra notes 126-28.
141. See id. When this scenario occurs, it is conceivable that the conflicting decisions will
be rendered by two different judges sitting in the same court. Consequently, the result will be that
the one judge overrules the other, and Pennsylvania courts have continuously advised that judges
sitting in the same court in the same case should not overrule each other on interlocutory orders,
as such a practice violates sound jurisprudence. See, e.g., Okkerse v. Howe, 556 A.2d 827 (Pa.
1989); City of Philadelphia v. Glim, 613 A.2d 613 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Golden v. Dion &
Rosenau, 600 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); The Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Co. v. Argonaut
Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 872 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc., 557 A.2d
404, allocatur denied, 578 A.2d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
546 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Farber v. Engle, 525 A.2d 864 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
142. As stated by the Commonwealth Court itself:
[The PLRB possesses administrative expertise in the area of public employee labor
relations and that great deference ought to be given to the PLRB's assessment of the
often competing concerns relevant to the issue of whether the conduct of an employer
or a union constitutes a refusal to meet the mutual obligation to bargain in good faith.
Richland Sch. Dist. v. PLRB, 454 A.2d 649 (Pa. Commw. 1983). Accord Borough of Nazareth
v. PLRB, 626 A.2d 493, 496 (Pa. 1993) (quoting Richland Sch. Dist. v. PLRB, 454 A.2d 649 (Pa.
Commw. 1988)); City of Philadelphia v. PLRB, 588 A.2d 67 (Pa. Commw. 1991), allocatur
denied, 598 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1991).
143. Ironically, while the Commonwealth Court has maintained its opinion that courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to compel or stay grievance arbitration under the U.A.A., the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether refusals to proceed to interest arbitration consitute unfair labor practices. See Bald Eagle,
451 A.2d 671.
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Commonwealth Court's decisions regarding the courts staying power
are correct, parties may also consider going to the courts for an
injunction to compel arbitration rather than filing an unfair labor
practice complaint with the PLRB. Accordingly, parties could view the
courts as the preferred vehicle to both compel and stay arbitrations. If
this scenario occurs, the courts will ultimately divest the PLRB of one
of its primary functions, namely, the ability to facilitate public labor
relations through the administration of public labor arbitrations. This
result would consistute a serious disruption of well-established labor
practice. 44
'

In Office of Administration v. PLRB, 598 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 1991), the Commonwealth refused
to bargain with prison guards to renew their collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, the
Commonwealth refused to bargain over eight items it deemed matters of "inherent managerial
policy" and thus, non-bargainable. Id. at 1275. See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.702 (1990) (stating
that public employers do not have to bargain over matters of "inherent managerial policy" with
public employees). The PLRB determined that the issues were bargainable and that therefore the
Commonwealth committed an unfair practice by refusing to bargain over the terms. 598 A.2d at
1276. The Commonwealth Court reversed the decision. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court, relied
on decisions such as Bald Eagle and East Pennsboro, which held that the PLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices. Id. at 1277. Consequently, the court pronounced
that "the PLRB below, best effectuates the goals and policies sought to be fostered by arbitration,"
and affirmed the PLRB decision. Id. at 1277.
Additionally, in Borough of Nazareth v. PLRB, 626 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1993), the court
discussed the refusal of a public employer to engage in interest arbitration with police officers
under Act I11. (For information as to Act I11, see supra note 23.) Holding that Act Ill and
PERA are to be read in pari materia, the Supreme Court, relying upon Bald Eagle, stated that "the
PLRB is in the best position to resolve all unfair labor practices." 626 A.2d at 496. Thus, the
court affirmed the PLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether refusals to go to Act Ill
interest arbitration constituted unfair labor practices. Id.
Perhaps Office of Administration and Nazareth serve as signals that the Supreme Court
would be significantly influenced by its previous decisions such as Bald Eagle, which holds that
the PLRB alone had the exclusive jurisdiction to hear arguable unfair labor practices, such as a
refusal to submit to grievance arbitration, when it ultimately agrees to consider the issues discussed
in this Article.
144. In 1982, a few years after the enactnent of the U.A.A., Professor Herbert L. Sherman
contended that the U.A.A. was not to apply to public labor contexts involving political
subdivisions. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 398; see also, supranote 30 and accompanying text.

